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THE WARRANTLESS USE OF THERMAL
IMAGING AND "INTIMATE DETAILS": WHY
GROWING POT INDOORS AND WASHING
DISHES ARE SIMILAR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Aaron Larks-Stanford'
With the advent of advanced technology in the war against crime, the
right of privacy has recently come under fierce attack.' Law enforce-
ment agencies use modern technology that provides them the ability to
"see" through clothing and walls, in order to determine whether an indi-
vidual possesses weapons, drugs, or other objects.2 Specifically, law en-
forcement officials employ thermal imagers to locate and catch criminals,
terrorists, and even polluters. Commercial users also utilize thermal im-
agers to check moisture-laden roofs, overloaded power lines, and sub-
standard building insulation.4 Thermal imagers detect differences in the
surface temperature of targeted objects and display those differences in
'J.D. candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See Merrick D. Bernstein, Note, "Intimate Details": A Troubling New Fourth
Amendment Standard for Government Surveillance Techniques, 46 DUKE L.J. 575, 575-76
(1996) (arguing that courts must reconsider Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in light of
law enforcement's use of new technology in government surveillance operations); see also
Todd M. Higey, Comment, The Effect of Constitutional Hermeneutics on Whether War-
rantless Thermal Imaging Is an Impermissible Search Under the Fourth Amendment, 36
DUQ. L. REV. 415, 435 (1998) (contending that a court, applying a textualist hermeneutic,
would in all likelihood find that the use of thermal imaging does not constitute a search);
Omar Ortega, Note, Thermal Imaging Devices: How the Government Privately Repealed
the Fourth Amendment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 173, 192 (1997) (stating that although courts
will not rely on "analogies to garbage searches, dog sniffs, or aerial observations," they
will rely upon the objects revealed by the thermal imagers).
2. See Jennifer Tanaka & N'Gai Croal, A New Way to Spot Weapons, NEWSWEEK,
July 31, 1995, at 8; see also Mindy G. Wilson, Note, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Im-
agery: Has This Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of
Fourth Amendment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 KY. L.J. 891, 896-98
(1995) (discussing the technological capabilities of thermal imaging devices).
3. See John Gibeaut, High-tech Heat Seeking: Warrantless Use of Detection Device
Splits Appeals Courts, 89 A.B.A J. 34, 34 (1998); see also Janice Fiorante, Night Sight,
INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Feb. 26, 1995, at A6. "[Night vision] technology is gaining
acceptance in public safety applications such as in the law enforcement, drug interdiction,
search and rescue, as well as industrial markets." Id. at A6.
4. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999).
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varying shades of gray and white.' The screen of the thermal imager re-
veals the object in somewhat less detail than a television picture.
Although law enforcement agencies use thermal imaging to detect a
variety of criminal activity,' the majority of cases challenging the consti-
tutionality of this law enforcement practice have dealt with the use of
thermal imagers to detect indoor cultivation of marijuana. Because of
5. See Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 34-35 (explaining that thermal imagers are unlike
television monitors, which display clearer pictures). Instead, thermal imagers are like
video cameras because they bring into range infrared rays coming from structures and
convert them into visual images that are fuzzy and unclear. See id.
6. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1521 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (stating that
thermal imaging, which relies on differences in radiant heat from objects, is not the same
as electromagnetic imaging); see also Douglas A. Kash, Prewarrant Thermal Imaging as a
Fourth Amendment Violation: A Supreme Court Question in the Making, 60 ALB. L. REV.
1295, 1297-99 (1997) (explaining in detail how thermal imaging devices work). The de-
vices measure the amount of heat emitted from structures by "utilizing optical electronic
sensors that can read the thermodynamic characteristics of the target." Id. at 1297-98.
They are about the size of a standard 35mm camera and can detect temperature differen-
tials "as small as one-half of a degree at a range 'between two feet and one quarter of a
mile."' Id. at 1298. Thermal imagers measure heat temperature by scanning infrared
wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum. See id. Because the infrared section of the
spectrum occurs at a much lower speed than that of visible light, the human eye cannot see
it. See id.
Thermal imagers convert the thermal readings to a computer, which creates different
displays, including video or real time pictures. See id. The thermal imagers detect radi-
ated heat, not converted heat. See id. Heat generally radiates until it is transmitted, ab-
sorbed, or reflected. See id.
Thermal imagers are passive devices, which means they do not transmit into the struc-
ture any form of pulse, ray or beam. See id. Instead, the device targets and measures the
emanation of "waste heat." See id. Users can employ the imager to detect targets beyond
the boundaries of one's property, as to not "intrude" in any way on the targeted property.
See id. Likewise, the imager also reveals hot spots on the exterior of buildings. See id.
Thermal imagers are available commercially, thus allowing the public the opportunity to
use the techniques practiced by government agents. See id. at 1298-99. Operators of the
device must use it after nightfall when the stored solar energy of the object begins to dissi-
pate. See id. at 1299. Users first calibrate the device by focusing on a "normal" source.
See id. Once calibrated, the operator targets the imager on an object or structure in order
to "see" heat patterns. See id.
7. See Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 34 (explaining that law enforcement officials are
using high-tech "snooping" to apprehend criminals, terrorists, polluters, and others). Al-
though the equipment used by law enforcement agents has become more sophisticated
and technologically advanced, Gibeaut suggests that the Supreme Court has been lagging
far behind by not creating clear precedent in order to protect individual freedoms from
government intrusion. See id. Under the current test for a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, it is not clear whether the use of such devices by government of-
ficials constitutes a search. See id. at 34-35.
8. See id. Law enforcement officials find thermal imagers especially helpful in de-
tecting heat signatures from high-intensity lights that aid in indoor marijuana cultivation.
See id. As the marijuana cultivators are forced to grow their product indoors, away from
the public eye, they must also use high-intensity lights to make up for the lack of sunlight.
[Vol. 49:575
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its potential intrusive impact, criminal defense attorneys challenge ther-
mal imaging as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.9 Law enforcement
agents find using thermal imagers to investigate the illegal cultivation of
marijuana especially helpful because thermal imagers detect the heat
signatures of high-intensity lights often used in the indoor cultivation of
marijuana.' ° The constitutional question is whether the use of thermal
imaging constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment."
Early Supreme Court decisions interpreted the Fourth Amendment as
protecting individuals from physical trespass by government agents.
The Supreme Court has concluded that there are certain "constitution-
ally protected areas" where the government cannot intrude without a
warrant." The Court, however, has also defined criteria for when the
See id.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn,
184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), affd on reh'g, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, vacated as motion
to suppress is affd, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996); see also State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 180
(Mont. 1997) (finding that the use of thermal imaging in a criminal investigation of a
marijuana growing operation constituted a "search" under the Montana Constitution).
But see United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied,
53 F.3d 1283 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995), and reh'g denied, 516 U.S. 1003
(1995) (concluding that the warrantless use of a thermal imager upon a marijuana growing
operation did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668,
669 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 879 (1995), and reh'g denied, 516 U.S. 1033
(1995) (holding that thermal imaging was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment in a case involving the manufacturing of marijuana).
10. There was a time when individuals cultivated marijuana commercially outdoors.
See Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 34. As law enforcement officials increased their use of so-
phisticated technology to apprehend individuals driven underground by the war on drugs,
however, marijuana producers had to move their operations indoors to stay in business.
See id. Some marijuana producers have even built their own underground bunkers that
consume enormous amounts of electricity, making them prime targets for thermal imag-
ers. See id.
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463-64 (1928) (finding that a police
wiretap was not prohibited because there was no physical entry upon the defendant's
property). Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead, warned:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which
the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most inti-
mate occurrences of the home.
Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961) (finding that eaves-
dropping violated the Fourth Amendment because the device used invaded the occupant's
premises). The Court held that the warrantless eavesdropping, which was accomplished
through an electronic device that penetrated the occupied premises, amounted to a physi-
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government may intrude without a warrant. For example, the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit police wiretapping of telephone calls be-
cause police acquire the information without having to physically enter
upon the defendant's premises.1 4 Traditionally, the Court has sought to
protect citizens against physical and "hands on" searches. 5
With the development of more sophisticated surveillance techniques,
however, the Court has interpreted the word "trespass" to encompass
more than merely physical intrusion upon an individual's property. 6 As
early as 1928, Justice Brandeis foresaw the development of technology
and warned against the implications of utilizing a standard that concen-
trated on the physical aspects of surveillance techniques. 7 In response to
numerous Fourth Amendment challenges to police activity that did not
involve physical trespass on an individual's property, the Court shifted to
an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as a protection of people,
rather than of property.18 In doing so, the Court redefined the term
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Concurring,
Justice Harlan concluded that in determining whether a particular activ-
ity constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy" would govern. 9 The
Court eventually adopted this test, known as the reasonable expectation
of privacy test or standard, in order to analyze whether a surveillance
cal intrusion and was, therefore, a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 509-510.
14. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that a police wiretap did not constitute a
search according to the Fourth Amendment). The police in this case were able to make
the interception using a wiretap without physically entering the defendant's property. See
id.
15. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509-10 (holding that warrantless eavesdropping
through a "physical intrusion" violates the Fourth Amendment).
16. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 247 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the privacy protection provided by the
Fourth Amendment also covers official surveillance that can be achieved through means
that do not involve a physical intrusion). Justice Powell provided that the "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" standard was developed to guarantee that the Fourth Amendment
protects privacy, even in an age when official surveillance by government agents can be
achieved without "physical penetration" on another's property. See id.
17. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (warning that the means
may someday be developed that would enable government agents to expose the most in-
timate details of the home in the courtroom). Justice Brandeis warned that "advances in
psychic and related sciences may bring a means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts,
and emotions." Id.
18. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people, not places"). The Court in Katz stated, "[Wlhat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection .... What he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area acces-
sible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52.
19. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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technique constitutes a search. °
Recently, the Supreme Court again altered its examination process in
determining whether surveillance techniques constitute searches within
21meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Under this newly refined method
of analysis, the Court concentrates not on the device or procedure used
by law enforcement to gather information, but rather on the content of
the information revealed.22 While still adhering to the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy standard in name, the Court, nonetheless, adopted a dif-
ferent test, commonly referred to as the "intimate details" standard."
Under the intimate details method of analysis, the Court focuses on
whether a given surveillance technique has revealed human activities of-
ten done within the privacy of one's own home.24
Applying this intimate details standard, however, is difficult because
the Court must determine what human activities actually constitute the
intimate details of an individual's life, and where revelation of such ac-
tivities, through the use of a surveillance technique, would violate the
Fourth Amendment. Within the scope of intimate details, defendants
have argued that courts should consider the clarity and sharpness of the
image created by the device to determine whether a Fourth Amendment
violation has occurred.25 Under another view, courts have focused on
20. See id. Justice Harlan stated that his "understanding of the rule that has emerged
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhib-
ited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id.
21. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 577-78. Cases like Dow demonstrate a refinement;
that is, the Court is conducting an ex post inquiry into the content of the information pro-
vided by the surveillance techniques. See id. Previously, the Supreme Court's inquiry fo-
cused upon the manner in which the information was obtained. See id. at 578.
22. See id. at 578 (surmising that although the Court still "putatively" adheres to the
Katz standard, the reasoning in many of its recent cases suggests that the Court believes
certain government activities do not constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment
because the procedure used does not necessarily reveal the intimate details of individuals'
lives). See id.
23. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (stating that aerial
photographs do not reveal intimate details to such a degree as to heighten constitutional
concerns); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986) (stating that aerial observa-
tion of curtilage can be invasive if the technology reveals "those intimate associations, ob-
jects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens"). Curtilage includes
"those out-buildings which are directly and intimately connected with the habitation and
in proximity thereto and the land or grounds surrounding the dwelling which are necessary
and convenient and habitually used for family purposes and carrying on domestic em-
ployment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990).
24. See Dow, 476 U.S. at 237-38.
25. Cf United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995). The Indiana State
Police performed thermal imaging scanning of Myers' residence, which revealed an inor-
dinate amount of heat suggesting to police that Myers was using indoor lights linked to
2000]
Catholic University Law Review
whether the activities under surveillance were in fact private and inti-
mate.26
This Comment examines the dilemma that emerges with the use of ad-
vancing technological techniques of surveillance. Part I studies briefly
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II surveys
the relevant case law and the lower courts' reliance on both the reason-
able expectation of privacy standard and the intimate details standard.
Part III analyzes the complications created by the lack of a stricter defini-
tion of intimate details and the fact that many circuits continue to rely
upon the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. In Part IV, this
Comment suggests that the courts should not create a test regarding in-
timate details that relies on the clarity and sharpness of the image cre-
ated. This Comment urges the Supreme Court to adopt a strict defini-
tion of intimate details that includes even mundane activities of everyday
life.
marijuana cultivation. See id. at 669. When the police searched Myers' home, they dis-
covered growing and processed marijuana plants, and various pieces of growing equip-
ment. See id. Myers pleaded guilty to federal drug charges after losing a motion to sup-
press evidence gathered using the thermal imager. See id. Myers appealed the
suppression ruling. See id. The Seventh Circuit held that thermal imaging does not "in-
trude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of an individual's home." Id. at 670. Con-
tinuing, the court held that none of the interests that create the need for "protection of a
residence, namely the intimacy, personal autonomy and privacy associated with a home,
are threatened by thermal imagery." Id.
In Myers, the defendant urged the court to consider limiting the use of less sophisticated
imagers, like the one police utilized to scan his residence, in order to prevent more inva-
sive intrusions by better technology. See id. at 670 n.1. Although acknowledging that fu-
ture technology might generate equipment that could penetrate the walls of one's home
unlawfully, the court rejected the defendant's argument because the imager used in Myers
did not, in fact, have that capability. See id. Hence, the court rebuffed the defendant's
contention that by allowing the use of the "bottom of the line" imager employed in this
case, the court was opening the door to the use of more sophisticated machines without
Fourth Amendment implications. See id.
26. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504-07 (10th Cir. 1995) (arguing
that it is quite clear that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the "unde-
tected and unmonitored performance" of domestic activities). The court held that the de-
fendants had a subjective and reasonable expectation that the government would not have
access to heat signatures of activities taking place within their home. See id. at 1507. The
use of thermal imaging, therefore, required a warrant. See id. The Seventh Circuit dis-
agreed with this argument in Myers, holding that thermal imaging threatened none of the
interests underlying the need to protect home privacy. See Myers, 46 F.3d at 670.
[Vol. 49:575
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I. THE SUPREME COURT TACKLES THE DEFINITION OF A SEARCH AS
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES DEVELOP MORE ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY
A. The Supreme Court's Determination of What Constitutes a Search
More than seventy years ago, the Supreme Court held in Olmstead v.
United States27 that the Fourth Amendment protected individuals only
from physical searches." Olmstead involved police wiretapping, where
the police did not have to go onto the defendant's property, but instead
utilized a wiretapping device at another location.29 The Court held that
the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the police from investigating the
defendant by gathering evidence using wiretap surveillance. 0 In focusing
on the notion that the Fourth Amendment simply prohibited law en-
forcement officials from physically trespassing on a person's property,
the Court found that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because they were able to intercept the conversations without having to
enter upon the defendant's premises.3 In the early stages of its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court concentrated upon the
physical nature of searches, thus protecting from Fourth Amendment at-
tack future government surveillance methods that do not physically tres-
pass.
B. Moving From Physical Trespass to Personal Trespass in Katz v.
United States
Years after its decision in Olmstead, the Court heeded Justice Bran-
deis' warning regarding the future implications of adopting a narrow
physical trespass interpretation of the term "search" in the context of the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Brandeis had warned earlier that advances
27. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
28. See id. at 466 (holding that a police wiretap was not proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (concluding that it
was "not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offense"). The violation is the invasion of the individual's "indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property." Id.
29. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Katz was convicted under an
eight-count indictment for transmitting wagering information by telephone. See id. at 348.
At trial, the government introduced into evidence Katz's telephone conversations. See id.
The FBI agents heard the telephone conversations by attaching an electronic listening and
recording device to the exterior of the public telephone booth used by Katz. See id.
2000]
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in technology would eventually enable law enforcement agents to seize
the most intimate details of the home without physical trespass.33 With
the technological advancement of surveillance techniques, the time was
appropriate for a modification in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
In Katz v. United States,m government agents attached an electronic lis-
tening device to a public telephone booth in order to listen and record
the petitioner's telephone call.35 Evidence gathered by the government
agents aided in convicting the petitioner of transmitting wagering infor-
mation over the telephone in violation of federal law.36 The petitioner
challenged the wiretap as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and re-
quested suppression of the recorded conversation. 37 The Court agreed
with Katz, concluding that the wiretap was unconstitutional, and sug-
gesting that the tapes should have been suppressed as fruits of an illegal
In its analysis, the Court considered the relationship between the right of privacy and
the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 350-51. The Court first refused to translate the Fourth
Amendment into a general constitutional "right of privacy." See id. The Fourth Amend-
ment, according to the Court, protects individual privacy against certain kinds of govern-
mental intrusion, "but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy
at all." Id. at 350. The Court decided eventually that the protection of a person's "gen-
eral" right to privacy, that is, a person's right not to be disturbed by other people, is-for
the most part-left to the states. See id. at 350-51.
The Court found the "trespass" doctrine, enunciated in Olmstead, no longer controlling.
See id. at 353. The Court concluded that the fact that the wiretapping device used by the
law enforcement agents "did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth [had] no con-
stitutional significance." Id. The Court found that it did not matter whether the phone
call had taken place in an office, in a person's apartment, or in a taxicab-a person making
a private telephone call is entitled to the Fourth Amendment's protections. See id. at 352.
A person who "occupies the [telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the
toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Id.
33. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis warns:
"In the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be." The progress of science in furnishing the Gov-
ernment with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways
may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers
from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled
to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the
psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs,
thoughts and emotions. "That places the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer" was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these.
To Lord Camden a far slighter intrusion seemed "subversive of all the comforts
of society." Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such in-
vasions of individual security?
Id. (citations omitted).
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. See id. at 348.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 348-50.
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search.3 In so doing, the Court overturned its earlier position in Olin-
stead that property interests govern the right of the government to search
and seize. 39 Instead, the Katz Court held that the Fourth Amendment
acts as a protection of individuals and not of placesi °
Although the majority attempted to shift the Court's position con-
cerning what activity constitutes a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court failed to establish a clear-cut or workable test.
Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, however, suggested a test to deter-
mine when certain law enforcement activity violates the Fourth Amend-
ment.4 ' Lower courts soon recognized Justice Harlan's approach, com-
monly known as the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard, as the
primary framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment challenges. 42
C. The Supreme Court Adopts Justice Harlan's Concurring Opinion in
Katz as the Test For What Constitutes a "Search"
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz, determined that a
Fourth Amendment violation occurs when law enforcement conducts a
warrantless search that infringes on an individual's reasonable expecta-
S 41
tion of privacy. Under this standard, if the Court finds that an expecta-
tion of privacy is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable,
the government activity equals a search. 44 Unless the government agency
has a warrant, the evidence gathered in that search is inadmissible at
trial. 5 If the Court finds that the individual's expectation of privacy is
not objectively reasonable, however, evidence obtained in the search is
38. See id. at 359.
39. See id. at 353 (holding that "the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure").
40. See id. at 351.
41. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. See generally Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524-25, 530 (1984) (holding that
because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to prison cells, a prisoner does not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738-40 (1979) (holding
that an individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on a
telephone); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588, 591 (1974) (holding that there is no ex-
pectation of privacy in the exterior of a vehicle left in a parking lot).
43. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44. See id. at 361.
45. See id. (holding that the defendant's conviction, which was based on the trial
court's admission of the illegally seized conversation regarding wagering information, was
invalid). The Court considered the fact that the government agents ignored the procedure
of "antecedent justification," an element the Court found to be "central" to the Fourth
Amendment. See id. The Court also concluded that the procedure of antecedent justifica-
tion was "a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in
this case." See id.
2000]
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admissible.4 The important determination concerns the definition of theS 4 1
reasonableness of the defendant's expectation of privacy. Justice
Harlan suggested that an enclosed telephone booth is an area like a
home in the sense that a person has a constitutionally protected reason-
able expectation of privacy in using the booth 8 Justice Harlan, who sug-
gested modestly that this twofold requirement emerged from prior deci-
sions, explained that the physical limitation of Fourth Amendment
protection created "bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may
be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.,
49
II. CASE LAW SINCE KATZ
A. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Requirement
In determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the Supreme Court focuses on whether an individual has made
efforts to prevent others from "seeing" the activity in question!" This
criterion respects the first prong of Justice Harlan's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy standard, which he described as a person's exhibition of
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy."
46. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 45 (1988) (reversing the trial court's
decision to suppress the evidence obtained through a "search" because the seizure did not
infringe upon an expectation of privacy that was reasonable).
47. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 581-82. Bernstein argues that the primary inquiry
under Justice Harlan's concurring analysis in Katz is "whether an individual's expectation
of privacy is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable." Id. If this expectation
is reasonable, the Court deems the surveillance technique a "search," thus making the evi-
dence obtained in the search inadmissible at trial. See id. at 581. If the Court, however,
finds the individual's expectation not objectively reasonable, then the Fourth Amendment
does not apply. See id.
48. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (providing that electronic
and physical intrusion in a place that is considered private may be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment). A person who uses a telephone booth, occupies it, closes the door behind
him, and pays the amount necessary to place a call, "'is surely entitled to assume' that the
conversation is not being intercepted." See id. at 361. The booth is a temporary private
place where society considers the occupant's expectation of freedom from intrusion,
though momentary, reasonable. See id.
49. Id. at 361-62.
50. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that the war-
rantless aerial observation of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a home did not
constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (finding that the warrantless aerial observation,
through the use of a precise and expensive camera, of a chemical factory did not constitute
a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
51. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that the defendant
showed an actual, or subjective, expectation of privacy by entering the phone booth and
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In Smith v. Maryland,2 the Court concluded that the use of a pen regis-
ter 3 by the New York Telephone Company upon the request of police
did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.54 Applying the standard set forth in Katz, the Court held that the
individual in question had no reasonable, legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the numbers he dialed.55 According to the Court, when people
release telephone numbers voluntarily to the telephone company, they
forfeit their expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.6
In addition to finding that no reasonable expectation of privacy ex-
isted, the Court emphasized the fact that the pen register did not provide
a report of the contents of the caller's communications." The Smith
Court compared the telephone numbers obtained by the police with the
conversation obtained in Katz and concluded that different approaches
were required. The Court stated that the content of a conversation is
something of substance requiring significant protection, whereas a list of
telephone numbers lacks substance that would mandate Fourth Amend-
ment protection.
Dissenting in Smith, Justice Stewart introduced the phrase "intimate
details" in the context of the Fourth Amendment. 60 According to Justice
shutting the door). A person's home is a place where one expects privacy. See id. How-
ever, the Fourth Amendment does not protect statements and activities that one exposes
to the "plain view" of the public because a person has shown no intention to keep such
statements or activities to himself. Id.
52. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
53. See id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161
n.1 (1977)). "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls
are actually completed." Id.
54. See id. at 745-46 (holding that the use of a pen register by the phone company
upon the request of police did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
55. See id. at 743 (stating that "even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expecta-
tion that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not one
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable") (internal quotations omitted).
56. See id. at 742-43.
57. See id. at 741.
58. See id. (noting that the pen register does not have the ability to reveal the subject
matter of the conversation, the identities of the caller and the recipient, or whether the call
was completed).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Bernstein, supra note 1, at 583 &
n.51 (noting that Justice Stewart concluded by stating that "the broad and unsuspected
governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails
necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards").
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61Stewart, the facts in Smith were similar to those found in Katz. Justice
Stewart determined that the petitioner's expectation of privacy was one
that society would consider reasonable." For Justice Stewart, it was not
enough that the subject matter of the communications was protected;63 he
explained that no telephone subscriber would want to reveal to the world
a list of the local or long distance phone numbers s/he has dialed.64 Jus-
tice Stewart reasoned, "[T]his is not because such a list might in some
sense be incriminating, but because it easily could reveal the identities of
the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate de-
tails of a person's life."65
B. Law Enforcement Agents Dig a Little Deeper and Find a Solution in
the Garbage
At this juncture in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a case would
turn upon a court's decision on whether the defendant's expectation of
privacy was reasonable. In Katz, Justice Harlan determined that a per-
son must first exhibit an actual, or subjective, expectation of privacy.
66
The defendant in Katz entered the telephone booth, closed the door, and
paid for the call, thus exhibiting an actual or subjective expectation of
67privacy. It remained clear, however, that for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, the Constitution permitted law enforcement agents to discover ac-
tivities, objects, or statements that were in "plain view." Those activities,
objects, or statements do not require a search warrant. One such object
is garbage.
In California v. Greenwood,6 the Court held that individuals do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage in opaque bags
61. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 748.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that a person who exposes "objects, activities, or statements" to the "plain view"
of the public, has not exhibited an actual expectation of privacy). By conversing in the
open, a person loses their Fourth Amendment protection against being will not be pro-
tected against being overheard. See id. According to Justice Harlan, the individual must
exhibit an actual, or subjective, expectation of privacy. See id. In Katz, the defendant ex-
hibited a subjective expectation by entering the telephone booth and closing the door. See
id.
67. See id. (concluding that even though the telephone booth is accessible to the pub-
lic, it is a "temporarily private place" where the momentary occupants have a reasonable
expectation of privacy).
68. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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placed outside their homes for sanitation collection.69 Relying on the
standard developed in Katz, the majority held that although the peti-
tioner adhered to a local ordinance by disposing his trash at the curb, he
conveyed it voluntarily to third parties such as "animals, children, scav-
engers, [or] snoops."'7
Justice Brennan, dissenting, stated that society should deem the peti-
tioner's expectation of privacy reasonable because even "a single bag of
trash" reveals the intimate details of an individual's life.71 Similar to Jus-
tice Stewart's dissent in Smith, Justice Brennan determined that because
the police procedure revealed intimate details, it constituted a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
2
C. Law Enforcement Agents, Along with Drug Sniffing Canines, Smell
Something in the Air
Based on the Court's decision in Greenwood, law enforcement officials
are now able to sift through and collect trash that one has left in front of
his or her house. In essence, the garbage has been "released" from the
house; thus, it is open to the public. This idea of release and emanation
is important in Greenwood, and became important in United States v.
Place,74 where the Court found again that a police activity was not a
search because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.75
In Place, officers who received a tip that the defendant might be in
possession of drugs stopped him in an airport.76 A dog designated for
drug sniffing "alerted 77 officers to the presence of drugs in the luggage.
69. See id. at 40-41.
70. Id. at 40.
71. See id. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[1]ike rifling through desk
drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the target's fi-
nancial and professional status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts, per-
sonal relationships, and romantic interests").
72. See id. at 50-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 40-41.
74. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
75. See id. at 698.
76. See id. at 698-99.
77. See State v. Boyce, 723 P.2d 28, 29 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). An officer's de-
scription of an "alert" is as follows:
[I]t usually starts off with an intensive sniffing of the area, followed usually by
what we call a tail flag, the tail will rise and hair at the base of the tail usually
comes up a little bit. That's usually followed by an aggressive pouring or
scratching at the article, the area which she's alerting on, and can be followed by
a biting sequence if I allow it to go that far.
Id.
78. See Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
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The Place Court concluded that an alert by a narcotics-sniffing, trained
dog establishes the requisite probable cause needed to conduct a further,
more thorough, search.79 The Court, in concentrating on the petitioner's
expectation of privacy, focused upon the nature of the technique used in
investigating the luggage.' ° Oddly, the Court returned to its earlier deci-
sions based on the physical aspect of the procedure, concluding that a
canine sniff did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because it
requires neither the opening of luggage nor the rummaging through its
contents.81 In addition, the Court emphasized that the specially trained
dog was capable only of detecting the presence of narcotics." Thus, ca-
nine sniffs are a minimally intrusive means of executing the strong inter-
est of curtailing the trafficking of narcotics."
D. The Reliance Upon the Intimate Details Standard
On occasion, the Court has declined to apply the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy standard set forth in Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Katz.s' One such instance involved the intimate details standard that Jus-
tice Stewart first articulated in his Smith dissent.85 Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States" also addresses the intimate details standard. The Supreme
Court in Dow noted that aerial photography of a chemical company's in-
dustrial complex was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.87 The Court concluded that the petitioner did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the open areas of the industrial
complex." Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, made a distinc-
tion between the covered buildings and offices in the complex, in which
Dow maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy, and the rest of the
complex, where no intimate activities took place.8
Although Dow went to great lengths to create and maintain "elaborate
security" at the complex, it failed to cloak all of its manufacturing
79. See id. at 706.
80. See id. at 705.
81. See id. at 707.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 706-07.
84. See generally Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-42 (1988); Place, 462 U.S. at 705-07.
85. See Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 747-48 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
87. See id. at 239.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 236 (stating that the "intimate activities associated with family privacy
and the home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between
structures and buildings of a manufacturing plant").
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equipment from aerial view. 90 In concluding that no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) aircraft was lawfully within
navigable airspace when it was photographing the industrial complex.91
Therefore, the government was not physically trespassing on the prop-
erty.9 In further support of its argument, the Court stressed that the
EPA's camera, although expensive and extremely precise, was not a
"unique sensory device." 93  The Court opined that the photographs
"[were] not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional con-
cerns."9 The Court held that if the government's means could record
conversations, see inside buildings, or reveal other intimate details, then
they might fall within the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.95
Dissenting, Justice Powell pointed out that the majority relied upon a
disapproved theory.9' Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun, Justice Powell argued that the majority's decision could not be rec-
onciled with the Supreme Court's decision in Katz9 He contended that
Dow's expectation of privacy throughout the entire complex was one
that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. 9 Therefore, the
EPA's surveillance should have constituted a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment as defined in Katz.99
Dow was unique in the sense that it involved an industrial complex,
versus an individual's private residence, which Justice Harlan described
90. See id. at 229.
91. See id. at 238.
92. See id. at 238 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984), for the posi-
tion that the "public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air").
93. See id. at 238 (distinguishing the standard, precision aerial mapping camera used
by the EPA from the highly sophisticated surveillance devices generally not available to
the public).
94. Id.; see also Bernstein, supra note 1, at 584 n.59 (noting that federal circuit courts
often cite these statements when upholding physically unintrusive government surveil-
lance).
95. See Dow, 476 U.S. at 238-39.
96. See id. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's holding that the
"warrantless photography does not constitute an unreasonable search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment is based on the absence of any physical trespass-a theory dis-
approved in a line of cases beginning with the decision in Katz v. United States"). Justice
Powell recognized that Dow Chemical Company expended energy in concealing a portion
of its plant. See id. The government officials were able to get a view that is not available
to the public, except by helicopter or plane. See id. at 249-50. But, the fact that there was
no physical intrusion upon the property was no longer important according to Supreme
Court precedence. See id. at 250.
97. See id. at 244, 246-47 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 248-49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
99. See id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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in Katz as the place where one expects privacy.'06 But in California v. Ci-
raolo, '° the Court held that the aerial observation of a fenced-in back-
yard of a home without a warrant was also not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' 2 Employing the intimate details
standard set forth in Dow, the Ciraolo majority concluded that the gov-
ernment's aerial observation of the petitioner's fenced-in backyard did
not reveal any intimate details.' 3 Thus, the Court noted that the peti-
tioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his own prop-
erty.
Justice Powell, dissenting in Ciraolo, argued that the surveillance was
of an indiscriminate nature because the photographs revealed more than
merely the respondent's curtilage.'5 The photographs also included the
houses and yards of the respondent's neighbors, along with the respon-
dent's own house.'° Justice Powell criticized the Court for straying away
from the Katz standard and cautioned that modern technology poses an




According to Justice Powell, the Court's decision would have serious im-
plications for outdoor family activities occurring in the curtilage of the
home, and warned that aerial surveillance was perhaps as invasive on
100. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that the expectation of privacy in one's home is one which "society is prepared to rec-
ognize as 'reasonable"').
101. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
102. See id. at 215.
103. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.8 (arguing that aerial observation of curtilage may
become intrusive, "either due to physical intrusiveness or through modern technology
which discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities [which
would] otherwise be imperceptible to police or fellow citizens").
104. See id. at 212-14.
105. See id. at 225 & n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that aerial surveillance is
almost as intrusive on a family's privacy as someone physically trespassing upon one's
property). Justice Powell argues that the majority's holding will do very little to protect
the privacy of the family. See id. Justice Powell also warns that, after the majority's hold-
ing, families can "expect to be free of official surveillance only when they retreat behind
the walls of their homes." Id.
106. See id. at 225.
107. See id. at 226.
While the rule in Katz was designed to prevent silent and unseen invasions of
Fourth Amendment privacy rights in a variety of settings, we have consistently
afforded heightened protection to a person's right to be left alone in the privacy
of his house. The Court fails to enforce that right or to give any weight to the
long-standing presumption that warrantless intrusions into the home are unrea-
sonable.
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family privacy as physical trespass'
III. THE LACK OF A STRICTER DEFINITION OF INTIMATE DETAILS
CREATES CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS
A. The Intimate Details Standard
In his dissenting opinion in California v. Ciraolo,'°9 Justice Powell re-
called that the Fourth Amendment "reflects a choice that our society
should be one in which citizens 'dwell in reasonable security and freedom
from surveillance.' 1. 0 Justice Powell stated:
While no single consideration has been regarded as dispositive,
"the Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of
the Framers of the Fourth Amendment,... the uses to which
the individual has put a location,.., and our societal under-
standing that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protec-
tion from government invasion.' '..
Over time, the Court's view of privacy invasions in and around the
home has shifted from presumptively unconstitutional, as in Justice
Harlan's dissent in Katz, to the more permissive standard in Ciraolo.,2
Accordingly, the government can conduct a surveillance that does not
involve physical trespass without a warrant, so long as the surveillance
only reveals objects and activities that would not be considered intimate
details." 3 This test applies even if the technology in question has the ca-
pability of revealing these intimate details. 4 Unless the individual can
prove that the particular warrantless government surveillance has actu-
108. See id. at 225 n.10 (arguing that after the Court's ruling in Ciraolo, families can be
guaranteed freedom from government surveillance only when they remain inside their
homes, behind the walls, away from the permitted intrusions of aerial observation).
109. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
110. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948)).
111. Id. at 220 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
112. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that the consequence of the plurality's analysis is that Fourth Amendment rights are in-
fringed only if police surveillance "interferes with the use of the backyard as a garden
spot," presuming that the police performing the surveillance were within their rights).
113. See United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 993 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that the use
of a thermal imager did not constitute a "search" because no intimate details were re-
vealed).
114. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 448-52 (holding that even though the search revealed that
the respondent had surrounded his yard with wire fencing and had posted "Do Not Enter"
signs, and that trees, shrubs, and the respondent's mobile home hid the greenhouse where
the cultivation took place from view, the police did not observe any intimate details con-
nected with the use of the home or curtilage).
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ally revealed such details, the Court considers the surveillance constitu-
tional."' This result negates the basic premise of the Fourth Amendment
and the holding in Katz that one's expectation of privacy in the home
and curtilage is, for the most part, reasonable."6
The Court, having decided two cases involving aerial observation of
property, determined the extent to which law enforcement officials may
use aerial observation to "see" real property and into homes. In Florida
v. Riley,"7 a plurality of the Court concluded that government officials
may "search" the curtilage of an individual's home from the air,"' as long
as the surveillance does not reveal any intimate details." 9 In Riley, the
law enforcement officer observed with his naked eye, from a helicopter
circling at an altitude of 500 feet, the interior of a partially covered
greenhouse in a residential backyard.' The Court declined to extend
Fourth Amendment protection over the curtilage in question because the
observation revealed no intimate details.' Justice Brennan, dissenting,
questioned how the majority's opinion would protect owners of lawful,
innocent, partially enclosed greenhouses.
The Riley decision is significant because previous Court decisions re-
garded the curtilage of one's home as deserving of the same paramount
115. See id. at 455 (holding that police conduct is not a search when no intimate details
are revealed).
116. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 244 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority's opinion, which held that the
taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, did not concur with the decision in Katz). Dow Chemical Company exhib-
ited an expectation of privacy of the industrial plant by attempting to conceal certain
things from the public view. See id at 235. The majority, however, according to Justice
Powell, based its decision on the fact that the government officials never physically en-
tered upon the property. See id. at 244 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Thus, according to Justice Powell, the majority diverged from the standard estab-
lished in Katz. See id.
117. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
118. See id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that although the search in Riley
actually revealed the curtilage of the property, the Supreme Court has considered the cur-
tilage as deserving of the same protection as the house).
119. See id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the significance of curti-
lage in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it is an area intimately linked to the
home).
120. See id. at 450.
121. See id. at 452.
122. See id. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "If the Constitution does not protect Ri-
ley's marijuana garden against such surveillance, it is hard to see how it will prohibit the
government from aerial spying on the activities of a law-abiding citizen on her fully en-
closed outdoor patio." Id.
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protection as the inside of the home.'23 Under the Court's holding in Ri-
ley, it becomes apparent that the Fourth Amendment no longer affords
the same presumptive protection to the home itself.2 4 Following Riley,
the location of surveillance is no longer relevant; instead, the objects po-
lice observe will determine the constitutionality of the search.
B. The Circuit Courts' Reliance Upon Katz and Their Reluctance to Find
the Defendant's Expectation of Privacy to be Reasonable in Thermal
Imaging Cases
A number of circuit courts, in reviewing challenges to the warrantless
use of thermal imaging devices by law enforcement agents, have often
found such devices to be constitutional within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. In these cases, government agents have relied upon
thermal imagers to discover hot spots that have allegedly revealed the
use of high intensity lights, which are often associated with the cultiva-
tion of marijuana. 6 In these cases, the government agents used the re-
123. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235-36, 238 (1986) (holding
that aerial observation of an industrial complex was permitted, but warning that the aerial
observation of curtilage may become invasive, either due to physical intrusiveness or
through modern technology if it discloses intimate associations, objects, or activities oth-
erwise undetectable to law enforcement or to the public).
124. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 448-52 (holding that even though the surveillance covered
the home and curtilage, it did not constitute a search because it revealed no intimate de-
tails).
125. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F,3d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
warrantless use of a thermal imager did not violate the Fourth Amendment). The court
found probable cause for a search warrant based on the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion's (DEA's) information concerning the defendant's elaborately constructed substruc-
ture with its own electricity supply and its own water supply from a nearby pond, the con-
tinuous use of an exhaust fan, and a check of phone records to various horticultural shops.
See id. at 852; see also United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding,
as a matter of first impression, that thermal imaging scanning is not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994). But see United
States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1500-01 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated en banc, 83 F.3d 1247
(10th Cir. 1996) (raising the possibility that thermal scans without a warrant violate the
Fourth Amendment and arguing that other circuit courts have "misframed" the Fourth
Amendment inquiry); cf United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1998), with-
drawn, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), superseded on reh'g, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.
1999). The Ninth Circuit initially held that the warrantless use of thermal imaging to scan
the home in order to detect a marijuana growing operation violated the Fourth Amend-
ment because the defendant had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in his resi-
dence. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1255. The court later withdrew that opinion, see Kyllo, 184
F.3d at 1059, and held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d
at 1043.
126. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1250-51; Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 851-52; Myers, 46 F.3d at 669;
Ford, 34 F.3d at 993; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057-58.
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suits of the thermal imaging as probable cause to obtain search warrants
for the defendants' premises."' In each case, the defendants have moved
to suppress the evidence obtained through the thermal imaging on the
grounds that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device is a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, these defendants argue
that the court should exclude evidence at trial because the subsequent
search warrants were illegal.
129
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Pinson,"3 ° reviewed a challenge
on Fourth Amendment grounds to the use of thermal imagers.' The
court held that the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment
when it employed thermal imaging to detect marijuana cultivation with-
out a search warrant.'32 The Eighth Circuit, applying the Katz analysis,
concluded that even if the defendant had exhibited an actual or subjec-
tive expectation of privacy, society did not recognize that expectation of
privacy as reasonable.'33 The court noted a similarity between thermal
imaging and the warrantless use of drug-sniffing police dogs that the Su-
preme Court had upheld in United States v. Place.'34 Finding specifically
that heat waste and smell are analogous, the Eighth Circuit stated that
the police did not intrude into the home, nor did they intrude upon the
individuals within the home.135 The court further held that the police did
not observe any intimate details of the home.' 36 The court concluded that
"[N]one of the interests which form the basis for the need for protection
of a residence, namely the intimacy, personal autonomy and privacy as-
sociated with a home, are threatened by thermal imagery.'
137
127. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1250-51; Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 851-52; Myers, 46 F.3d at 669;
Ford, 34 F.3d at 993; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201
(6th ed. 1990). Probable cause is the "reasonable ground for belief that a person should be
arrested or searched ... [t]he evidentiary criterion necessary to sustain an arrest or the
issuance of an arrest or search warrant." Id.
128. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1250-51; Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1499; Ishmael, 48 F.3d at
851-52; Myers, 46 F.3d at 669; Ford, 34 F.3d at 993; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057-58.
129. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1250-51; Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1499; Ishmael, 48 F.3d at
851-52; Myers, 46 F.3d at 669; Ford, 34 F.3d at 993; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057-58.
130. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
131. See id. at 1056-59.
132. See id. at 1059.
133. See id. at 1058-59.
134. See id. at 1058; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding
that the use of drug-sniffing dogs in a public place does not fall within the meaning of a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes).
135. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059.
136. See id.
137. Id.; see also Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1508-09 (10th Cir. 1995). The court in
Cusumano stated:
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Although the Eighth Circuit did not rely specifically on Dow,"' this de-
cision influenced the court and other post-Katz Fourth Amendment de-
cisions. 3 9 Like Dow and Katz, Pinson emphasized that the challenged
search did not intrude upon any reasonable expectation of privacy9
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Ford,41 likewise reviewed a
thermal imaging case where the defendant argued against the admissibil-
ity of evidence obtained through a search of his home.' 2 In Ford, the
police obtained a warrant that was based in part on the results of a ther-
mal image scan that revealed that the defendant's home released an "in-
ordinate amount of heat.' ' 143 The Eleventh Circuit held that the defen-
dant did not have a subjective expectation of privacy because he
intentionally took steps to vent the heat that the thermal imaging de-
tected.'" The court further noted that even if the defendant had exhib-
ited an actual or subjective expectation of privacy, it was one that society
would not be prepared to recognize as reasonable.
To determine whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the Ford court used a test that was nothing more than an intimate details
The dog sniff, like the thermal imager, extracts information about the interior of
an object solely from an analysis of external physical phenomena .... [However,
as] the imager lacks the precision of the dog sniff, we decline to extend Place to
allow the warrantless use of thermal imagers upon a home.
Id.
138. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
139. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59 (holding that the search in question did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because the defendant's expectation of privacy was not one soci-
ety would be prepared to call reasonable). The court likens the thermal scan to the "war-
rantless use of police dogs trained to sniff and identify the presence of drugs." Id. at 1058.
The dog sniff is like the thermal imager in the sense that it "extracts information about the
interior of an object solely from an analysis of external physical phenomena." Id. The
court points out, however, that because the thermal imager does not have the precision
that the dog sniff has, the court declined to extend Place to allow the warrantless use of
thermal imagers upon a home. See id.; see also Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
The Eighth Circuit also stated that the detection of the emanated heat does not consti-
tute an intrusion into the home. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059. The court found that "no
intimate details of the home were observed, and there was no physical intrusion upon the
privacy of the individuals within." Id. The court concluded that "[n]one of the interests
which form the basis for the need for protection of a residence, namely the intimacy, per-
sonal autonomy and privacy associated with a home, are threatened by thermal imagery."
Id.
140. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059; see also Dow, 476 U.S. at 238-39; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
141. 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
142. See id. at 993.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 995.
145. See id. at 995, 997.
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analysis.' 6 The court stated that "[o]ne such value that has emerged as a
significant factor in the [Supreme] Court's Fourth Amendment analysis
is the intimacy of detail and activity that a surveillance technique reveals
in a particular case.' ' 147 The court relied on Dow for the principle that
even if sophisticated surveillance equipment is used, no warrant will be
required by the Fourth Amendment unless the technique reveals inti-
mate details.' The court concluded that based upon the evidence, "no
intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were ob-
served," so there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
49
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Myers,"° also held that the
practice of using thermal imaging of the defendant's home did not consti-
tute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' Relying
on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Pinson, the court held that even if the
defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy, society was not pre-
pared to recognize such an expectation of privacy as reasonable. The
court found that the interests that require protection of a residence, spe-
cifically intimacy, personal autonomy, and privacy, are not threatened or
damaged by the use of thermal imaging."' Cases claiming that the use of
thermal imagers constitutes searches within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment have increased as the use of thermal imaging grows in
popularity with law enforcement agencies.
In United States v. Ishmael, 1 4 the Fifth Circuit held that "the crucial in-
quiry, as in any search and seizure analysis, is whether the technology re-
veals 'intimate details.""" The court held that the warrantless use of a
thermal imager was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment."' Specifi-
cally, the court found that thermal imaging was acceptable under the
Fourth Amendment because it did not reveal intimate details within the
scanned structure."
57
146. See id. at 996.
147. Id. at 996.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 996-997 (quoting Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989)).
150. 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995).
151. See id. at 670.
152. See id.
153. See id. (citing United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994)).
154. 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
155. Id. at 855.
156. See id. at 857.
157. See id. at 856 (stating that the thermal imager scans only heat differentials in ob-
jects (not the objects themselves), thus adding no threat to the privacy expectations that
the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect).
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In Ishmael, the petitioners had expended significant energy to conceal
their marijuana growing and distribution business, including manually
mixing the concrete they purchased in order to build the facility."8 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the petitioners had "exhibited a subjective
expectation that their hydroponic laboratory would remain private,"'59
thus satisfying the first part of the Katz analysis.lW The court went on to
frame the second part of the Katz analysis around the use of technology
and the degree of sophistication of the technological device used by the
In Ishmael, a confidential source informed a DEA officer that he/she had delivered con-
crete re-mix to a secluded property owned by Rohn and Debra Ishmael. See id. at 851.
The source stated that the Ishmaels took measures to hide their purpose for the concrete;
namely, they mixed it by hand near the concrete truck and then drove the concrete to an-
other location on the property. See id. Based on this information, the DEA agent went to
the property and noticed two mobile homes and a trailer, but no illegal activity. See id. A
year later, the DEA agent renewed the investigation and made another trip to the prop-
erty where he found a "roughly" built road, a large hole, 60 empty bags of cement, a dump
truck, and a concrete re-mixer. See id. When the agent checked Rohn Ishmael's criminal
record, the record revealed four separate marijuana-related incidents, including several for
the cultivation of marijuana. See id. The DEA agent then surveyed the property by air
and found a mobile home and large steel building that stood next to a two-acre pond. See
id. The agent returned to the property on foot two more times and found a structure be-
neath the steel building. See id. This substructure was installed with electrical wiring, an
exhaust fan, and exposed tubes that brought water. See id
The DEA agent eventually used thermal imaging on two separate occasions, one by air
and the other by foot. See id. at 851-52. The agent subpoenaed the Ishmaels' telephone
records and discovered numerous telephone calls to horticulture shops, "two of which ap-
peared on a narcotics intelligence computer base as suppliers for other marijuana cultiva-
tors." Id. at 852. The agent also subpoenaed their electrical utility records, which re-
vealed that the power usage of substructure was extraordinarily high. See id. The results
of the thermal imaging showed an enormous amount of heat emanating from the substruc-
ture and the area surrounding it. See id. After the DEA agent obtained a warrant based
in part on the thermal imaging readings, the DEA seized 770 marijuana plants and several
firearms from the Ishmael property. See id.
Initially, the evidence, including the marijuana plants, was suppressed on the theory that
the Ishmael's had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and because their effects, such as
the secret metal building, were protected from governmental surveillance and intrusion.
See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 211, 212, 214 (E.D. Tex. 1994). The Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's order granting the Ishmaels' motion to suppress. See
Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 857.
The Fifth Circuit opined that the building was in an "open field" and therefore not
within any protected curtilage. See id. at 856-57. The building, according to the court, was
outside the Ishmaels' residential curtilage because it stood 200 to 300 yards from the Ish-
maels' mobile home and was not enclosed with a fence. See id. at 856 n.7. The court de-
termined that when used in an "open field," the thermal imager does not violate the
Fourth Amendment because it is "passive and non-intrusive." See id. at 857.
158. See id. at 851-52.
159. Id. at 854.
160. See id. at 854-55.
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government agents. 6' The court warned against the propensity for viola-
tion of rights because as technology becomes more sophisticated, there
will be a greater likelihood that its use will constitute an unreasonable
intrusion."' The Fifth Circuit, however, held that as the officers en-
hanced their observation with a thermal imager in an "open field," there
was no violation of the Fourth Amendment because it was passive and
non-intrusive.
Most of the circuit courts that have addressed this issue have made the
determination that the use of thermal imaging to detect indoor marijuana
cultivation does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.' 64 Confusion over which test to apply, however, in deter-
mining whether a procedure constitutes a search, and what constitutes
intimate details, has led to inconsistency among the courts' rulings.
161. See id. at 855.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 857 (holding that because the "sanctity of one's home or business" was
not disturbed, the DEA's warrantless use of a thermal imager in this case was not a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). The court relied on United
States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1992), where law enforcement officers stood near the
defendant's barn, which the court determined was beyond the residential curtilage, and
looked inside to observe the drug operation. See id. at 276. The Fifth Circuit in Pace con-
cluded that "there is no business curtilage surrounding a barn lying within an open field,"
so the officers were entitled to "come as close to the structure as necessary to look inside
without physically entering." Id. The Fifth Circuit applied elements of the "open fields"
doctrine, as well as the pre-Katz "physical entrance" analysis. See id.
In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303-05 (1987), the Supreme Court heard a case
almost identical to Pace. The Court accepted, for the sake of argument, that the defen-
dant's barn was a business. See id. at 303. The Court noted that the officers never entered
the barn nor any other structure on Dunn's premises. See id. at 304. The Court said,
"[T]hey merely stood, outside the curtilage of the house and in the open fields upon which
the barn was constructed, and peered into the barn's open front." Id. The Court con-
cluded that the officers were standing in the open fields and observing the phenylacetone
laboratory in the barn, which the Constitution does not forbid them to do. See id. The
Court further asserted that this conclusion flowed "naturally from [its] previous deci-
sions." Id.
164. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that
an aerial surveillance of a private home through thermal detection equipment, to deter-
mine whether marijuana was being grown inside, was constitutional); see also United
States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670
(7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994). But see United
States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated en banc, 83 F.3d 1247
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the warrantless use of thermal imaging is not constitutional).
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C. Dissension From the West: Courts that Have Found the Use of
Thermal Imaging as a Search Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment
1. The Montana Supreme Court's Bold Decision
At least two courts have recently found that the right to an individual's
privacy outweighs the government's interest in curtailing the cultivation1656
and distribution of marijuana. In State v. Siegal,'6 the Montana Su-
preme Court held that the use of thermal imagers in criminal investiga-
tions constituted a search under the Montana Constitution, thereby re-
quiring a search warrant supported by probable cause. 67 The court
further stated that the use of thermal imaging in a criminal investigation
implicated Montana's uniquely protected privacy terests.
In Siegal, the defendants employed certain measures to maintain their
privacy on their property, which was heavily wooded and completely
fenced.'69 For example, the defendants built a small building that was
adjacent to the ranch house on the property.170 The police suspected that
the defendants were involved in the illegal cultivation of marijuana." '
The police conducted a thermal imaging scan of the defendant's property
from a neighbor's property about twenty-five to thirty feet from the small
building, which, as it turned out, was the defendants' marijuana growing
shed. 72 The thermal imager indicated that the shed was discharging a
165. See generally United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1998); State v.
Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 192 (Mont. 1997).
166. 934 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1997).
167. See id. at 192 (holding that "in the absence of a search warrant, the use of thermal
imaging as a criminal investigative tool implicates Article II, Section 10 of Montana's Con-
stitution and, [therefore] requires the demonstration of a compelling state interest, other
than enforcement of the criminal law").
168. See id. at 180.
The privacy interests uniquely protected by Article II, Section 10 of the Montana
Constitution are also implicated by the use of thermal imaging in the context of a
criminal investigation and . . . the use of this technology by the government, in
the absence of a search warrant, requires the demonstration of a compelling state
interest other than enforcement of the criminal laws.
Id.
169. See id. at 178 (finding that the defendants took "numerous steps to insure their
privacy including posting the property with 'No Trespassing' signs, painting the fence posts
orange, maintaining perimeter and interior fences and locking the gates"). Like the de-
fendant in Katz, the defendants here exhibited an actual or subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. See id. at 190.
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considerable amount of heat, while a scan of the other buildings on the
property showed normal heat emissions.' The police concluded that the
distribution of heat energy was congruous with the presence of heat
lamps typically used in marijuana cultivation, which hang from the ceil-
ing.74 The law enforcement agents then used the evidence obtained in
the search to acquire warrants for the arrest of the defendants.75
The court pointed out that cases from other jurisdictions discussing the
warrantless use of thermal imaging "have generally used at least one of
the following three approaches: the waste-heat approach, the canine-sniff
approach, or the technological approach.' ' 76 Under the "waste-heat ap-
proach," courts have analogized the released heat to garbage left outside
the home for sanitation collection. 77 The Siegal court rejected the
"waste-heat approach" because of the presence of obvious differences
between garbage and heat.77 The court concluded that waste-heat can
only be detected by means of a technologically advanced device while
garbage can be studied simply by hand.
Citing United States v. Place,'° the Siegal court noted that many courts
have analogized the use of thermal imaging with the use of specially
trained drug-detecting dogs to determine that a thermal imaging search
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.'' The Siegal court rejected this




176. Id. at 185.
177. See id. (holding that "since a warrant is not required to examine curbside garbage,
these courts reason that, in the same way, no warrant is required to examine heat dis-
carded from one's home").
178. See id. at 186 (concluding that the heat was not readily accessible to "animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public," as the garbage had been
in Greenwood). Also, "since dissipation is an inevitable result of heat production, it does
not require a deliberate act nor is it preventable in the same way that one can conceal in-
criminating garbage." Id. One does not have to leave the garbage on the street, making it
available to the public. See id. at 185-86. Instead, one may choose to keep the garbage
inside or may dispose of it in another location, where individuals would be less likely to
study its contents. See id. In this way, leaving garbage on the street requires a conscious
decision and action. See id. Heat dissipation, on the other hand, requires nothing of the
user. See id. at 186.
179. See id. at 180 (citing Michael L. Huskins, Marijuana Hot Spots: Infrared Imaging
and the Fourth Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1996) (stating that the laws of ther-
modynamics dictate that no matter how much one insulates, heat will still escape from a
structure; but, the fact that one insulates to keep heat inside a structure indicates a "sub-
jective expectation of privacy.")).
180. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
181. See Siegal, 934 P.2d at 186-87.
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information regarding heat emissions of both an illegal and legal nature,
the use of canine-sniffs only provides information regarding the illegal
activity of narcotic possession.'2 The court, however, did not accept the
analogy that just as the smell of narcotics does not necessarily imply their
presence, the radiation of inordinate amounts of heat does not necessar-
ily imply that one is acting illegally."'
In examining the "technological approach," which involves the analysis
of underlying technological and scientific principles involved in the de-
vice used, the court determined that the law enforcement officials' use of
a thermal imager was not a search because this technology could not re-
veal any "intimate details" of the activities taking place within the home,
or within this case, the small building.' The court agreed with the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion in United States v. Cusumano'8 that the pertinent in-
quiry is whether the defendants possess "an expectation of privacy in the
heat signatures of the activities, intimate or otherwise, that they pursue
within their home"' that they do not knowingly display to the general
public.1 From this analysis, the Siegal court concluded that the defen-
dants met the first prong of the Katz test by exhibiting an actual or sub-
jective expectation that the operation on their property, in a small shed,
would remain private."'
In determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the crucial principle of expecting
privacy in the home. 9 The Siegal court relied on the notion that the citi-
zens of Montana deeply embrace the right of privacy 9° and have a differ-
ent opinion of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy. T9
182. See id. at 187 (finding that a thermal imager cannot limit its detection solely to
information regarding illegal activities). A thermal imager is indiscriminate, in that it im-
poses itself upon activities both legal and illegal. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 187-88.
185. 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995).
186. Id. at 1502.
187. See Siegal, 934 P.2d at 190.
188. See id.
189. See id. (stating that the "law enforcement officers in this case before us admitted
that they also used the thermal imager to scan the [d]efendants' residence, a place where
an individual has the greatest expectation of privacy"). In this situation, the court rea-
soned that the people of Montana would find an expectation of privacy in the home rea-
sonable. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. (stating that Montana's citizens would be "shocked" and would consider it
a "gross invasion of their privacy to learn that the government could, without their consent
... monitor the heat signatures created by activities conducted within the confines of their
private homes and enclosed structures for the purpose of drawing inferences about the
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The court concluded that the warrantless use of thermal imaging as a
criminal investigative tool implicates Article II, section 10 of Montana's
Constitution, and therefore requires the state to demonstrate a compel-
ling state interest, other than the enforcement of the criminal law, in or-
der to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 92 Without a sufficient dem-
onstration of such an interest, the Siegal court held that Montana could
not utilize the thermal imaging device constitutionally without a properly
executed warrant.9 3
2. The Ninth Circuit's Step Forward
In 1998, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in United States v.
Kyllo,'9 "as a matter of first impression," that the warrantless use of a
thermal imager to scan a home in order to detect marijuana cultivation
violated the Fourth Amendment 95 Before this decision, in 1994, the
Ninth Circuit had ruled on Kyllo and focused its concern upon the inti-
mate details that the thermal scan could reveal. 196 Kyllo, the defendant,
legality of such activities").
192. See id. at 192 (holding that there was no demonstration of a compelling state in-
terest by the government). The court found that the use of thermal imaging at issue vio-
lated the defendants' right to privacy, guaranteed under Article II, section 10 of Mon-
tana's Constitution. See id. Further, the court interpreted Montana's Constitution to
mean that Montana must demonstrate a compelling state interest in order to use thermal
imaging, thus making it more difficult for the government to violate an individual's expec-
tation of privacy. See id.
193. See id.
194. 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), super-
ceded on reh'g, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit initially held that the war-
rantless use of thermal imaging to scan the home in order to detect a marijuana growing
operation violated the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had manifested a sub-
jective expectation of privacy in his residence. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1255. The court later
withdrew that opinion, see Kyllo, 184 F.3d at 1059, and held that no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1043. Accordingly, the constitutional analysis in
the 1998 opinion is not the current law in the Ninth Circuit. Although the 1998 opinion
has been withdrawn, it provides a good example of how a federal court confronted with
thermal imaging issues in the future might deal with them.
195. 140 F.3d at 1255 (9th Cir. 1998).
196. See United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd and re-
manded, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), super-
ceded on reh'g, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). One of the early Kyllo opinions stated that
the courts would be required to investigate the capacity of the thermal imaging device to
reveal intimate details. See 37 F.3d at 530-31. The court reasoned that if the thermal im-
aging device could reveal human forms and their activities, then it would effectuate an un-
constitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. The court explained:
[W]e must decide whether Kyllo exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and
whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to acknowledge as rea-
sonable. But this inquiry cannot be conducted in the abstract. We must have
some factual basis for gauging the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging device,
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appealed the denial of a motion to suppress all evidence received in a
search of his residence.197 The warrant used by the governmental agents
had been predicated on the results of a thermal imaging of Kyllo's resi-
dence, conducted to detect the presence of heat lamps used in the growth
of marijuana.' 98 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
for a factual determination of the technological capacity of the thermal
imaging device.' 9 The court decided that it needed a factual basis on
which to determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy.m The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to determine
whether "on the one extreme, this device can detect sexual activity in the
bedroom, . . . or at the other extreme, whether it can only detect hot
spots where heat is escaping from a structure.,
2
11
The Ninth Circuit cited Dow for the proposition that particular war-
rantless government surveillance will only be unconstitutional if it re-
veals intimate details.20 But, the Ninth Circuit deviated from the analysis
in Dow by requiring an investigation into the capacity of the thermal im-
aging device to reveal intimate details.2°3 If the device could observe and
which depends on the quality and the degree of detail of information that it can
glean.
Id. (citations omitted).
197. See id. at 528.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 531.
200. See id. at 530-31.
201. Id. (stating that the issues are whether Kyllo exhibited an actual expectation of
privacy and whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to acknowledge as
reasonable).
A United States Bureau of Land Management agent investigated a suspected marijuana
cultivation and distribution operation, and discovered information suggesting Kyllo was
involved. See id. at 1250. The information was further supported by Oregon state law en-
forcement officers, including that Kyllo lived with his wife and other suspects in the inves-
tigation. See id. at 1250-51. Moreover, Kyllo allegedly had told a police informant that he
and his wife could supply the informant with marijuana and in the previous month, police
arrested Kyllo's wife for delivery and possession of a controlled substance. See id. Sus-
pecting marijuana cultivation, the agent subpoenaed Kyllo's utility records. See id. The
records indicated that Kyllo's electricity use was abnormally high. See id. The agent,
therefore, requested a thermal imaging scan of Kyllo's home. See id.
The thermal imaging scan revealed abnormally high levels of heat emanating from
Kyllo's home. See id. The agent concluded that the heat signature indicated the presence
of high intensity light often used to cultivate marijuana indoors. See id. Thus, the agent
presented an affidavit to a federal magistrate judge who issued a search warrant for
Kyllo's home. See id. During the search, the agent observed an indoor marijuana cultiva-
tion operation and seized marijuana, weapons, and drug paraphernalia. See id. Kyllo was
indicted on one count of the manufacture of marijuana. See id.
202. See id. at 531 n.3 (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238
(1986)).
203. See id. at 530-31.
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reveal human forms and their activities, the court was prepared to hold
such a search unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.204
On remand, the district court held that the use of thermal imagers was
not an intrusion into the Kyllo's home.25 The district court concluded
that police neither observed intimate details of the home, nor intruded
upon the privacy of the residents within the home.2°' The district court
made the factual finding that the thermal imager could not penetrate the
walls or windows to reveal conversations or human activities. There-
fore, the district court held that the use of thermal imaging was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2
This decision held as a matter of first impression," that the warrantless
use of thermal imagers to scan homes in order to detect marijuana culti-
vation was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.29 The decision was
written by the Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior United States
District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, who was sitting by
designation.2'0 The issue arose out of the United States Bureau of Land
Management's investigation of a suspected marijuana growth and distri-
bution operation when the Bureau requested that a member of the Ore-
gon National Guard examine the defendant's home using an Agema
Thermovision 210 thermal imaging device.21'
In analyzing whether the petitioners had met the first prong of the
Katz test, the Ninth Circuit determined that the petitioners had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in their home. The court stated that,
"[s]urely a defendant, such as Kyllo, who moves his agricultural pursuits
inside his house has similarly manifested a subjective expectation of pri-
204. See id.





209. See id. at 1250, 1255 (concluding that "the use of a thermal imager to observe heat
emitted from various objects within the home infringes upon an expectation of privacy
that society clearly deems reasonable").
210. See id. at 1250.
211. See id. at 1250-51 (noting that the government officials used the thermal imaging
device after Kyllo's utility records were subpoenaed and it was concluded that Kyllo's
electricity use was abnormally high).
212. See id. at 1252-53 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986), which
concluded that the defendant had satisfied the test for manifesting his subjective intent
and desire to maintain his privacy by placing a double fence around his backyard mari-
juana crop).
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vacy in those activities." '213 The court rejected the heat-waste analogy214 . 1
used by other courts. 4 Following the lead of the Tenth Circuit,21 1 the
court concluded that its analysis should focus on the reasonableness of
213. Id. at 1253 (citing United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1995)).
214. See id. (rejecting the "heat-waste" analogy and finding that the "purpose and
utility of the thermal imager is to reveal the heat signatures of various objects and activi-
ties occurring inside a structure").
215. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on
other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that "[t]he pertinent inquiry is not,
therefore, whether the [d]efendants retain an expectation of privacy in the 'waste heat'
radiated from their home but, rather, whether they possess an expectation of privacy in
the heat signatures of the activities, intimate or otherwise, that they pursue within their
home").
The defendants, Robert Porco and Christopher Cusumano, appealed their convictions
for the manufacture of marijuana. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1499. The warrant was
predicated upon information received from the defendants' landlady indicating that the
defendants had set up an electric generator that ran continuously in the garage. See id. at
1510. Claiming that they were interested in growing vegetables, the defendants rewired
the basement's electrical system and installed new lighting. See id. The landlady re-
marked that she noticed a strong, musty odor in the basement, and that although the de-
fendants had no identifiable employment or other means of support, they consistently paid
their rent in cash. See id. Other suspicious activity included the defendants' consumption
of roughly twice as much electricity as a typical household, modifications to the base-
ment's electrical system, and the defendants acting in a manner that made a local insur-
ance agent fear for his safety when the defendants refused him entry to the house. See id.
The court concluded that these facts provided "more than ample support for the warrant
that was issued." Id.
The Tenth Circuit held, however, that the "[u]se of a thermal imager enables the gov-
ernment to discover that which is shielded from the public by the walls of the home." Id.
at 1509. In holding that the government must obtain a warrant before using thermal im-
aging upon a home, the court relied on United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16
(2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), affd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), which stated:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat
thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him with-
out disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty-worth
protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide
some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure,
some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle.
Id.
The court also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 714 (1984), holding that private residences are places in which the individual has an
expectation of privacy free from warrantless intrusion by the government. See Cusumano,
67 F.3d at 1509. In Karo, the government placed an electronic beeper inside a can of ether
and used the beeper to track the movement of the cans over the course of several months.
See Karo, 468 U.S. at 708. Law enforcement officers eventually followed the defendants
to a private residence suspected of concealing a drug lab. See id. Activation of the beeper
revealed that the can of ether had been stored in the suspected home. See id. The defen-
dants argued that the warrantless use of the beeper impermissibly intruded into the pri-
vacy of their home. See id. at 714. The Court held that the revelation of a single detail
about the interior of the home-whether or not the beeper was still inside the home-suf-
ficed to violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 715.
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the subjective expectation of privacy. 6
Focusing on United States v. Karo,2 7 the Ninth Circuit determined here
that the Supreme Court was clear in its finding of a reasonable expecta-
tion in the privacy of one's home."' The court also focused on the Su-
preme Court's decision in Silverman v. United States219 to emphasize the
importance of protecting privacy within the home against intrusive acts
by the government.220  Finally, the court, relying on Payton v. New
York, 221 argued that warrantless searches and seizures in the home are
presumptively unreasonable.2
The court then shifted its analysis to concentrate on intimate details.2z
The court concluded that the thermal imaging search exposed sufficient
intimate details to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 4 Focus-
ing on the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Cusumano,22' the
court noted that domestic activities could be observed through a thermal
imager.226 The court further pointed out that it did not matter whether
216. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253 (addressing the issue of "whether Kyllo's subjective
expectation of privacy regarding the heat signatures of the activities within his home is one
that society is prepared to acknowledge as reasonable").
217. 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding that the individual's expectation in the privacy
of a residence is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable).
218. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253 (citing Karo, 468 U.S. at 714).
219. 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (stating that "[a]t the very core stands the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion").
220. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253 (citing Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511).
221. 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[The Fourth Amendment] has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably
be crossed without a warrant.").
222. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 590).
223. See id. (stating that the court is "concerned about the nature of the information
that the thermal imager used to scan Kyllo's home is able to reveal").
224. See id. at 1254 (concluding that the details revealed by a thermal imager are suffi-
ciently "intimate" to determine that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred).
225. 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th
Cir. 1996). The court held that the thermal imager
intrudes upon the privacy of the home not because it records white spots on a
dark background but rather because the interpretation of that data allows the
government to monitor those domestic activities that generate a significant
amount of heat .... [WIhile the imager cannot reproduce images or sounds, it
nonetheless strips the sanctuary of the home of one vital dimension of its secu-
rity: "the right to be let alone" from the arbitrary and discretionary monitoring of
our actions by government officials.
Id.
226. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1254 (holding that it is not disputed whether the Agema
210 could reveal details such as intimate activities in a bedroom because the manufacturer
testified that the imager used in this case is "[s]ensitive to temperature differences as small
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the image created by the device was clear or not because the rapid im-
provement of technology would develop devices with the ability to create
227clearer images.
In an attempt to interpret "intimate details, ',22 8 the Ninth Circuit found
persuasive the fact that the thermal imager may not only reveal the inti-
mate details of sexual activity, but may also detect common activities in
the home.29 The court went so far as to say that those daily activities in
the home, which some might consider trivial and mundane, were suffi-
ciently "intimate. '" Based on this reasoning that simple, everyday ac-
tivities constitute intimate details of the home, the court concluded "that
the use of a thermal imager to observe heat emitted from various objects
within the home infringes upon an expectation of privacy that society
clearly deems reasonable."23'
By the end of 1998, both the Supreme Court of Montana and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled that the warrantless use of a thermal
imager constitutes a search within the proscription of the Fourth
Amendment.
as 0.9 degrees F[ahrenheit]"). Relying on a point made by the court in Cusumano, the
court in Kyllo noted that it would not be difficult to determine the "origin of two commin-
gled objects emitting heat in a bedroom at night." Id
227. See id. (concluding that while the Agema is a relatively unsophisticated thermal
imager that cannot reveal highly intimate details, the rapid pace of improvement of tech-
nology is responsible for the development of much more powerful and sophisticated ther-
mal images "which are increasingly able to reveal the intimacies that we have heretofore
trusted take place in private absent a valid search warrant legitimizing their observation").
228. See id. at 1254-55.
229. See id. (holding that even if a thermal imager does not reveal details such as sex-
ual activity in a bedroom, a thermal image could identify a variety of daily activities con-
ducted in any home such as the use of washers and dryers, ovens, showers and bathtubs,
and any other household appliance that releases heat). It is not so much a question of how
intimate an activity is, but what kind of expectation of privacy is found in one's home. See
id.
230. See id. at 1255 (concluding that even the routine and trivial activities occurring in
the home are sufficiently "intimate" as to violate the Fourth Amendment if law enforce-
ment observes the activities without a warrant). But see Tracy M. White, Note, The Heat
Is On: The Warrantless Use of Infrared Surveillance to Detect Indoor Marijuana Cultiva-
tion, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 295, 308 (1995) (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit, if presented with
the facts of United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994), would in all likelihood
agree with the Eighth Circuit that the warrantless use of a thermal imager in order to de-
tect indoor marijuana cultivation does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
231. Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1255 ("It matters not that the search uncovered nothing of any
great personal value to respondent .... A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose
nothing but the bottom of a turntable."); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717-
18 (1984) (holding that revelation of a single detail about the interior of the home, re-
gardless of whether the beeper placed inside a can of ether was still inside the home, was
sufficient to violate the Fourth Amendment).
2000]
Catholic University Law Review
3. The Ninth Circuit's Step Backward
On July 29, 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals withdrew its 1998
Kyllo decision.2  On September 9, 1999, after rehearing the arguments, a
modified three judge panel held that the warrantless use of a thermal
imager does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.2 3 Although two of the original judges, Circuit Judges
Noonan and Hawkins, were present, Judge Brunetti had replaced the
Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr. 4 Because Judge Noonan dissented ,
it appears that this replacement caused the Ninth Circuit to decide Kyllo
differently.
Judge Hawkins, who had written the dissent in the 1998 decision,236
wrote the majority opinion, holding that the warrantless use of the ther-
mal imager does not violate the Fourth Amendment.27 In addition to
concluding that Kyllo failed to demonstrate a subjective expectation of
privacy in the waste heat emitted from his home,23 the court stated that
the crucial issue was whether the technological device revealed "intimate
details., 239 The court ruled that the thermal imager did not reveal any in-
timate details of Kyllo's life because it "merely indicated amorphous 'hot
spots' on the roof and exterior wall and not the detailed images of pri-
vate activity that Kyllo suggests the technology could expose. '2 ° Judge
Hawkins, following the lead of Dow and Myers, warned that thermal im-
aging technology might advance to the point where it will no longer be a
permissive non-intrusive observation, but will become an impermissible
warrantless search. 1
Judge Noonan, dissenting, argued that the majority relied erroneously
232. See United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
233. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999).
234. See id. at 1043 n.1.
235. See id. at 1048 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (determining that Kyllo had an expecta-
tion of privacy as to the interior of his home, which society is prepared to find reasonable).
236. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1255 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (finding that thermal imaging
technology does not constitute a search because it does not intrude into protected areas).
237. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1046 (stating that Kyllo did not demonstrate a subjective
expectation of privacy in the heat emissions from his home).
238. See id. at 1046.
239. See id. at 1047 (quoting United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir.
1995)).
240. Id. (quoting United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994), and stating
that the information revealed "is neither sensitive nor personal, nor does it reveal the spe-
cific activities within the.., home").
241. See id. at 1045-46 (concluding that based on the facts in this case, there was no
violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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on the intimate details analysis found in the dicta of Dow. 4' While ac-
knowledging the majority's error in relying on intimate details analysis,
Judge Noonan also argued that the majority concluded erroneously that
the dangers presented by the thermal imager were merely potential and
243not actual. Judge Noonan then proceeded to list examples of those in-
nocent activities that produce heat within the walls of a home, and prof-
fered that society would obviously consider an expectation of privacy as-
sociated with these activities to be reasonable.2"
IV. ADVOCATING AN ANALYSIS THAT MIRRORS EITHER THE
MONTANA SUPREME COURT OR THE WITHDRAWN KYLLO OPINION
The Fourth Amendment seeks to protect individuals in their "persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures."2' 5 Presently, however, the Supreme Court has not created a clear
rule to guide lower courts in their analysis of warrantless thermal imag-
ing.26
The war on drugs has been costly, with the government allocating a
substantial amount of money to law enforcement agencies for devices
that provide easier and more efficient searches of the growth, distribu-
tion, and use of narcotics.'4 Critics argue, however, that the war on
drugs is more costly in terms of the losses sustained in individual rights.2"
Law enforcement agencies use the thermal imager to detect indoor
242. See id. at 1050 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[flo rely on the phrase 'in-
timate details' as stating the criterion is to wrench the phrase from context").
243. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the intrusion into the home is
real).
244. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (providing such examples as the use of an indoor
sauna, the making of ceramics in a basement kiln, and the hothouse cultivation of plants in
a domestic greenhouse).
245. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
246. See supra Parts I & II.
247. See Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 889-95 (1987) (chronicling government expenditures to
combat the "drug war").
248. See id. at 925-26 (1987) (discussing how the protections historically afforded by
the Bill of Rights have been reduced by the "War on Drugs"). Wisotsky argues that a
product of the "War on Drugs" is a "political-legal context" in which drug enforcement
activities are protected as an exception to the notion that laws must satisfy the deepest
principles of fairness and justice. See id.; see also Joe Davidson, The Drug War's Color
Line: Black Leaders Shift Stances on Sentencing, THE NATION, September 20, 1999, at 42
(explaining that African-American leaders, while citing numerous statistics on the harmful
consequences of discriminatory law enforcement and disproportionate penalties for crack
cocaine offenses, are acting to reform racist policing and sentencing in the war against
drugs).
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marijuana cultivation.249  Although thermal imagers cannot measure
temperature, they do compare the amount of heat radiating from differ-
ent objects.9 Officers record the results of thermal imaging on video
tape; objects with high surface temperatures are displayed in white, while
cooler objects are displayed in shades of gray and black.51 In Siegal, the
Montana Supreme Court noted that at the time it decided the case in
1997, thermal imagers were not capable of "see[ing] through walls" or
"produc[ing] distinct images of a person, object or activity within a struc-
ture."'252
According to the Supreme Court of Montana, Montanans have height-
ened expectations of privacy."3 That is not to say that the remaining
states in the union have little expectations of privacy. On the contrary, it
is important to consider that in the United States, where "political ideol-
ogy" is based in great part on the theories of John Locke and John Stuart
Mill, the concept of private property and the privacy it affords to indi-
viduals is probably as crucial as those liberties protected in the Bill of
Rights. Americans embrace their property and their ability to obtain it;
the right of privacy simply comes with the property. By placing the bur-
den on the government to prove a compelling state interest warranting a
reasonable search, the law ensures the protection of the privacy interests
of individuals.
Before withdrawing the decision, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the use of a thermal imager constituted a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.5 After finding
that the defendants manifested an expectation of privacy in their activi-
ties within the home,255 the Ninth Circuit then considered whether inti-
249. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
250. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 1994).
251. See Ed Glenn, An Eye in the Night Sky, OR. Bus., Nov. 1, 1995, at 11. More ad-
vanced thermal imagers, or FLIRs, are now capable of distinguishing temperature differ-
entials in color. See id.
252. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 181 (Mont. 1997) (noting that thermal imaging does
not differentiate between a heat source produced by a legal activity, such as growing Afri-
can Violets in a greenhouse, and one produced by an illegal activity, such as growing
marijuana).
253. See id. at 191 (explaining that Article II, section 10 of Montana's Constitution af-
fords broader protections to a citizen's right of privacy).
254. See United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 184
F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), superceded on reh'g, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). The with-
drawn opinion held that the use of thermal imagers to detect heat emitted from the vari-
ous activities and objects found within the home, including people, infringes upon the ex-
pectation of privacy that society clearly recognizes as reasonable. See id. at 1255.
255. See id. at 1253 (finding that the defendant manifested an expectation of privacy
by moving his agricultural pursuits indoors); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
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mate details were involved. 256 The Ninth Circuit took the initiative to
create a stronger, viable definition for intimate details.257 It is a definition
that expands the list of activities and objects that the government must
protect and upon which it cannot infringe without a warrant.
While the term "intimate" commonly refers to those activities that are
sexual in nature, or at the very least, relational, the Ninth Circuit had de-
termined that such a requirement was too under-inclusive. 25 What con-
stitutes intimate details, according to the Ninth Circuit, had included
those "routine and trivial activities" of everyday life. 9  Perhaps more
importantly, the Ninth Circuit had made it clear that even if the device in
question was relatively unsophisticated and therefore unable to reveal
intimate details to any great extent, or in great clarity, technology is con-
tinually advancing, and eventually, there will be more sophisticated de-
vices in use and in development that will be able to reveal even greater
details.26°
Adopting either the Montana Supreme Court's or the Ninth Circuit's
withdrawn approach is desirable. When governments take drastic meas-
ures to solve society's ills, they oftentimes sacrifice as their first victims
the rights and liberties of individuals. The war on drugs is a prime exam-
ple. The concern, which Judge Noonan explained appropriately in his
Kyllo dissent,26' is that advancing technology will allow law enforcement
agents to perform the type of unfettered surveillance best and horrify-
ingly described in George Orwell's 1984.262
211 (1986) (finding that the defendant manifested his subjective intent and desire to main-
tain his privacy by placing a double fence around his marijuana crop).
256. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253-55 (finding that the details unveiled by the thermal
imager were sufficiently "intimate" to give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation).
257. See id. at 1254-55.
258. See id. at 1254-55 (stating that even if a thermal imager does not disclose details
of sexual activity in a bedroom, it may very well detect other activities of daily life such as
showering and bathing, the use of appliances such as ovens, washers, dryers, and any other
ones that release heat).
259. See id. (holding that the possibility that such instruments could reveal anything
about our lives within our homes is enough to constitute a violation). The sanctuary of the
home, which reflects security, is compromised by a thermal imager search. See id. at 1254.
260. See id. at 1254.
261. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (Noonan, J., dis-
senting) (warning that the majority views the dangers of Orwellian surveillance as
"speculative and at most potential").
262. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 67 (1963). Orwell writes:
Both of them knew-in a way, it was never out of their minds-that what was
now happening could not last long. There were times when the fact of impending
death seemed as palpable as the bed they lay on, and they would cling together
with a sort of despairing sensuality, like a damned soul grasping at his last morsel
of pleasure when the clock is within five minutes of striking. But there were also
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V. CONCLUSION
With the constant advancement of technology, government officials
and agents have acquired sophisticated means of monitoring those mem-
bers of society whom the government suspects are breaking the law (spe-
cifically suspected marijuana growers and distributors). A major prob-
lem with such means, specifically thermal imaging devices, is that they do
not discriminate between legal activities and illegal activities. The ques-
tion arises whether such a thermal imaging scan is a "search" within the
proscription of the Fourth Amendment, thereby requiring a search war-
rant. The Supreme Court and consequently, federal and state courts,
have been inconsistent in applying one specific standard, and in deter-
mining what constitutes reasonable expectations of privacy and activities
of daily life that are considered "intimate." The advent of new technol-
ogy will call upon the Supreme Court to provide a coherent legal frame-
work for analyzing and weighing technological devices used and the right
to privacy embraced by the public. If the Supreme Court wishes to en-
sure that Fourth Amendment protections remain relevant and strong, it
must lay down a clear standard that will not only provide consistent lead-
ership for the lower courts, but that will also protect the privacy interests
of citizens. This nation's highest Court should protect these privacy in-
terests to the heightened extent that the Supreme Court of Montana has.
The thermal imager creates a great danger. That danger is the false
sense that thermal imaging merely reveals to law enforcement agents
only a "fuzzy picture" of the illegal operations of a bunch of "pot-heads"
who have attempted to take advantage of the law by moving their
"weed" indoors and have naively "released" the heat from the growing
process. For the vast majority of this country's citizens, however, the
home holds within its walls far more intimate activities. And while some
may consider activities such as washing dishes or doing laundry ordinary
and mundane, these activities still deserve the utmost protection from
government intrusion.
times when they had the illusion not only of safety but of permanence. So long
as they were actually in this room, they both felt, no harm could come to them.
Getting there was difficult and dangerous, but the room itself was sanctuary. It
was as when Winston had gazed into the heart of the paperweight, with the feel-
ing that it would be possible to get inside that glassy world, and that once inside it
time could be arrested.
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